# An SLA survives an audit when its clock start, its tiers and its exceptions are written down and the data shows them applied

REMEDIATION SLA, read 10 Nov 2026

**The short answer.** CISA's BOD 22-01 set two weeks for newer CVEs in the KEV catalog and six months for older ones. BOD 26-04 replaced it on June 10, 2026. FedRAMP's 2026 rules give a table of days by impact and reachability. Pick one clock start, tier the days, and record every exception.

## What the directives set

[BOD 22-01](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-22-01-reducing-significant-risk-known-exploited-vulnerabilities), issued 2021-11-03, required federal agencies to remediate each KEV catalog vulnerability by the date in the catalog. As written, the default was within two weeks for vulnerabilities with a CVE ID assigned in 2021 or later and within six months for CVE IDs assigned before 2021, adjustable in the case of grave risk. CISA's page now states that BOD 22-01 is revoked and superseded.

[BOD 26-04](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk), issued 2026-06-10 and titled Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk, supersedes BOD 19-02 and BOD 22-01. Its text states that the clock starts at the earlier of CISA adding the CVE to KEV or the agency identifying the vulnerability on an asset and updating the CDM dashboard. Items that also need forensic triage must be remediated or mitigated within three days. Phase III runs 180 days from issuance, and agencies not fully automated report KEV status bi-weekly. The day counts for its Table 1 appear on the page as an image that this publication could not read as text on 2026-11-10; read them there.

## What the catalog itself shows

The catalog's JSON feed carries a due date on each entry. In the feed read on 2026-11-10 (version 2026.11.10), 324 entries were added between 2025-11-10 and 2026-11-10. Of the 162 added before 2026-06-10, due dates fell 21 days out for 66, 14 days for 55, 3 days for 31, 7 days for 7, 2 days for 2 and 5 days for 1. Of the 162 added from 2026-06-10, 126 carry a 3-day due date and 36 carry 14 days. The practical lesson is that the catalog's own clock now varies by entry, so an SLA of a fixed number of days for all KEV items will sometimes be looser than the federal due date.

## What FedRAMP asks of providers

FedRAMP's Consolidated Rules for 2026 include a Vulnerability Detection and Response ruleset ([FedRAMP, Rev5 Class C](https://www.fedramp.gov/2026/reference/rev5/c/vulnerability-detection-and-response/)). For providers with Class C certifications, rule VDR-TFR-PVR sets timeframes from evaluation by Potential Agency Impact rating (PAIN) and exploitability and reachability. The table on that page reads, in days, for the three columns it labels LEV + IRV, LEV + NIRV and NLEV: PAIN-5, 2, 4 and 16; PAIN-4, 4, 8 and 64; PAIN-3, 16, 32 and 128; PAIN-2, 48, 128 and 192. This publication reads the columns as likely exploitable and internet reachable, likely exploitable and not internet reachable, and not likely exploitable. The page labels these as SHOULD expectations and states that rule mandates trace to BOD 26-04, with obtaining and maintaining certification dates of 2026-12-07 for Rev5.

The table is a good template for private-sector programs, because it ties the number of days to two things you can measure: exploitability and exposure.

## Writing the SLA so it holds

Five decisions turn a table of days into something an auditor can test.

- **Clock start.** Choose one: first detected, first matched to an asset, or listing in KEV. BOD 26-04 uses the earlier of two events. Writing "first seen in any source" removes arguments about when a scanner noticed.
- **Tiers.** Tie each tier to the scoring rule in the risk scoring guide, so the tier is computed, not assigned by hand.
- **Pause and stop rules.** State what stops the clock (waiting on a vendor patch, a maintenance window approved by change control) and who approves it. Brinqa documents an SLA data model with different deadlines for assets with and without compliance requirements, which is one way to encode the difference.
- **Mitigation versus remediation.** FedRAMP's rules do not use the two terms interchangeably: mitigation reduces risk; remediation eliminates the vulnerability. Say which closes the clock.
- **Exceptions.** Each exception needs an approver, a reason, a compensating control, an expiry date and a review. Exceptions with no expiry are where audits find findings.

## Evidence an auditor will ask for

Keep, for a sample of closed and open items: the detection date, the tier and the inputs that set it, the due date, the closing date and method, the verifying scan, and any exception record. Produce SLA attainment as a percentage by tier, and the list of items past due with their ages. The measuring guide defines the formulas.

Two habits make the difference in practice. First, freeze the SLA document with a version and date, and never edit it in place. Second, test the evidence path quarterly by pulling 25 items and tracing them end to end, before an auditor does.

## Sources

- CISA, BOD 22-01 (revoked, superseded by BOD 26-04): https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-22-01-reducing-significant-risk-known-exploited-vulnerabilities (read 10 Nov 2026)
- CISA, BOD 26-04, Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk (read 10 Nov 2026)
- CISA, Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (JSON feed): https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json (read 10 Nov 2026)
- FedRAMP, Consolidated Rules for 2026, Vulnerability Detection and Response (Rev5 Class C): https://www.fedramp.gov/2026/reference/rev5/c/vulnerability-detection-and-response/ (read 10 Nov 2026)
- Brinqa documentation, SLA data model: https://docs.brinqa.com/docs/sla (read 10 Nov 2026)

Last reviewed 10 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://riskbasedvulnerabilitymanagement.com/guides/the-remediation-sla-that-survives-an-audit/
